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Abstract 
 
This paper examines why, after five decades of integration, the European Union's 
representation in international institutions still varies considerably. This question has so 
far not attracted much scholarly attention in political science; most studies focus on 
the legal status of the EU in international organisations, in particular in UN bodies. The 
EU does not consistently 'speak with one voice' as a global actor, but its international 
representation varies from the Commission, the EU presidency (and troika) over the 
European Central Bank to the national, sometimes coordinated positions of the 
member states. The Union's role in global governance is thus constrained by a 
bewildering pattern of external representatives. Theoretical approaches suggest four 
explanatory factors: issue areas, institutions, interests and identities. The paper argues 
that the usual focus on issue areas in terms of the distribution of legal competences 
alone cannot explain the EU's current role as a 'patchwork power'. Institutional 
factors (such as an organisation's rules of participation and the EU's own coordina-
tion mechanisms) and the member states' constellation of interests have to be taken 
into account as well.  
 BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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1. Introduction: 'Patchwork Power' Europe in Global Governance 
 
The European Union (EU) is the world's leading exporter of goods, largest trader of 
services and biggest donor of both development and humanitarian aid, the second 
largest foreign investor and the second destination for foreign migrants (behind the 
US).1 The euro has become the second most important currency after the US dollar, 
and the EU's gross domestic product (GDP) equals that of the United States. The EU 
thus clearly constitutes an economic superpower, even though it represents only 7 
percent of the world's population. Unlike the US, the Union's commitment to effective 
multilateralism is a defining principle of its external policy. The European Security 
Strategy aims at "[t]he development of a stronger international society, well func-
tioning international institutions and a rule-based international order".2 Moreover, 
"[t]aking international co-operation as a precondition for meeting numerous global 
challenges, the EU has a clear interest in supporting the continuous evolution and 
improvement of the tools of global governance".3 Today, Europe's weight in the 
global institutions (in terms of seats and/or votes) usually exceeds the relative share in 
population (and often also in GDP) which it represents.4  
 
Yet, "Eurocrats seem unsure whether to be cocky or anxious about Europe's position 
in the world".5 Unlike nation-states, the European Union does not conduct its external 
relations according to a single pattern.6 Its representation in international fora varies 
strongly: from the Commission, for instance in the trade rounds of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), or the rotating EU presidency negotiating on behalf of the EU 
(e.g. in the climate change negotiations) and the tasks of the High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) over the complicated ad hoc 
solutions in the Bretton Woods institutions (where the member states are dispersed 
over several voting groups that also include third countries) to the national, some-
times coordinated policies of the member states, such as in most bodies of the 
United Nations (UN) or in security-related organisations.  
 
From a neofunctionalist perspective, the EU's 'single voice' should have steadily 
grown, in particular in areas of potential economies of scale and positive externali-
ties (such as increased bargaining leverage in international fora), as a result of 
                                                 
1    André Sapir (2007), "Europe and the Global Economy", in André Sapir (ed.), 
Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, Brussels, Bruegel, p. 1. 
2   European Council (2003), European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe in a Better 
World", Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 9. 
3   European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of 
Multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 final, Brussels, 10 September 2003, p. 3. 
4   See Alan Ahearne et al. (2006), "Global Governance: An Agenda for Europe", Bruegel 
Policy Brief, 7, Brussels, Bruegel, p. 3; and Table 2 below. 
5   The Economist (2007), "Overweight but Underpowered", 6 September 2007. 
6    For the sake of simplicity, the ‘EU’ will in many cases refer to either the European 
Community (EC) or the European Union, without prejudice to the debate on whether the EU is 
implicitly provided with a legal personality in addition to the express legal personality of the 
Community. The Lisbon Treaty would give the EU a single legal personality. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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spillover effects from one sector to another.7 However, no major spillovers have 
occurred with regard to the EU's external representation in international institutions. 
The Commission has not been able to expand from its important role in trade policy 
to other areas, interest groups have not successfully lobbied for a unified represen-
tation, and member states have been blocking rather than demanding 'a single 
voice' for the Union.  
 
The question of representation in international institutions constitutes a major issue in 
the debate on the reform of global governance.8 Since the early 1990s scholars and 
practitioners have increasingly called for the Union "to speak more with a single 
voice".9 In view of the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
reinforcement of the second pillar since the late 1990s, these calls have become 
louder.10 As a contribution to the European Convention drafting the Constitutional 
Treaty, the Commission in 2002 proposed that external representation of the euro 
zone in the international economic and financial organisations "should be a matter 
for a single body" and, more generally, that a "coherent single representation of 
collective interests be ensured by the High Representative/Commissioner for external 
relations".11 With regard to the United Nations, the Commission deplores that the EU's 
"real influence – and its ability to project European values – on the world stage still 
falls short of its economic and combined political weight, or indeed its contribution to 
the funding of UN organisations".12 For the WTO on the other hand, Pascal Lamy, at 
the end of his mandate as Commissioner for trade, drew the lesson that "when it 
chooses to pursue a truly federal policy, the EU can play a decisive role on the world 
stage", and even set the international agenda, with "a far greater 'weight' than the 
sum of the Member States".13  
 
The Union's (in)capability to 'speak with one voice' is likely to become more crucial in 
the future, given the expansion in the CFSP, the increased external dimension of 
                                                 
7   A functional spillover may result from the lobbying efforts of societal actors, a political 
spillover from the pressures exerted by national elites who realise that problems can no longer 
be satisfactorily solved at the domestic level, and a cultivated spillover may be engineered 
by the supranational EU institutions. See Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991), "Neo-functionalism: 
Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC", 
Millennium, 20(1), pp. 4-6. 
8   Global governance is generally defined as "the management of global problems and 
the pursuit of global objectives through the concerted efforts of states and other international 
actors". Martin Ortega (2007), "Building the Future: The EU's Contribution to Global 
Governance", Chaillot Paper, 100, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 46. 
9   European Commission (2001), European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 
final, Brussels, 25 July 2001, p. 27.  
10   See, for instance, C. Fred Bergsten (1997), "The Impact of the Euro on Exchange Rates 
and International Policy Cooperation", in Paul R. Masson, Thomas H. Krueger and Bart G. 
Turtelboom (eds.), EMU and the International Monetary System, Washington, D.C., 
International Monetary Fund, p. 19; or Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2004), "A Single EU Seat in the 
IMF?", Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(2), pp. 229-248. 
11   European Commission (2002), Communication from the Commission, A Project for the 
European Union, COM(2002) 247 final, Brussels, 22 May 2002, pp. 8 and 16. 
12   European Commission (2003), The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice 
of Multilateralism, op.cit., p. 3. 
13   Pascal Lamy (2004), Trade Policy in the Prodi Commission 1999-2004: An Assessment, 
Brussels, European Commission, 19 November 2004, p. 4. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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traditionally internal policies (e.g. justice and home affairs, environmental or 
monetary issues), the enlargement rounds and the emergent global challenges. Yet, 
not only has the advent of the euro failed to trigger an overhaul in external financial 
arrangements, also the accession of twelve new members in 2004 and 2007 did not 
lead to reforms in external representation. Many observers "have seriously under-
estimated the barriers preventing Europe from speaking as a single voice, even in the 
relatively limited area of international monetary affairs".14 The Constitutional Treaty 
would have provided the Union with a full-time president of the European Council 
and a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, assisted by a European External Action 
Service, but it would not have put an end to this patchwork of international 
representation. Nor would its successor, the Lisbon Treaty.15 In other words, the 
proposed changes "relate to the 'wrapping' rather than 'the content'" and "the 
problems of representation remain unaltered".16  
 
This continuing fragmentation is far from maximising Europe's clout in world politics – it 
is instead rather likely to impair the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's policies 
and to undermine its commitment to multilateralism and global governance. As 
Cœuré and Pisani-Ferry argue, "the current arrangements involve significant 
deficiencies that weaken the European position in international negotiations and 
thus involve welfare costs".17 Europe risks punching below its weight in global affairs 
because "the EU is a 'fragmented power' in which institutions, member governments 
and citizens do not agree on how to exploit or defend Europe's economic 
strengths".18 This situation has led to an "over-representation and under-effectiveness" 
which some consider as "increasingly unsustainable".19  
 
                                                 
14   Kathleen R. McNamara and Sophie Meunier (2002), "Between National Sovereignty 
and International Power: What External Voice for the Euro?", International Affairs, 78(4), p. 850.  
15   The Lisbon Treaty foresees that the president of the European Council, elected for a 
term of two and a half years, shall ensure the Union's external representation concerning the 
CFSP at his or her level, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The High Representative will be one of the vice-
presidents of the Commission, preside over the Foreign Affairs Council, represent the Union for 
CFSP matters and in this regard also express the EU's position in international institutions. 
Except for Foreign Affairs, the presidency of Council configurations will continue to be held by 
member states on the basis of equal rotation. Apart from the CFSP (or other cases provided 
for in the Treaties), the Commission shall ensure the Union's external representation.  
16    Inge Govaere, Jeroen Capiau and An Vermeersch (2004), "In-Between States: The 
Participation of the European Union in International Organizations", European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 9(2), p. 186.  
17    Benoît Cœuré and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2003), "One Market, One Voice? European 
Arrangements in International Economic Relations", Paper prepared for the conference on 
'New Institutions for a New Europe', Vienna, 10-11 October 2003, p. 19. 
18   The Economist (2007), op.cit. 
19    Jean Pisani-Ferry (2005), "The Accidental Player: The EU and the Global Economy", 
Paper prepared for the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 
Delhi, 25 November 2005, p. 13. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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In view of such drawbacks of the current situation, this paper examines why the 
Union's representation in international institutions20 still varies so widely, turning the EU 
into a 'patchwork power'. This question has so far not attracted much scholarly 
attention in political science; most studies focus on the legal status of the EU in 
international organisations, in particular in UN bodies, or empirically investigate 
specific cases of the EU's autonomy in multilateral fora.21 As a 'patchwork power', the 
EU does not consistently 'speak with one voice' and display 'international actorness',22 
but its external representation varies across international fora and its role in global 
governance fluctuates. Pisani-Ferry characterises the EU as an 'accidental player' – 
"one which, depending on its internal arrangements or the lack of them, is sometimes 
at the table and sometimes off the table",23 and Sapir sees the EU as a 'fragmented 
power' whose responsibility is shared or split between different actors, which impedes 
it from taking a more active stance in global governance.24  
 
In search for an answer to the puzzle of this 'patchwork power' Europe, the paper 
draws on case studies from the literature and on integration theories. Different 
approaches suggest four explanatory factors: issue areas, institutions, interests and 
identities. These 'four i's' are further unpacked in the following sections. The paper 
argues that a focus on the distribution of legal competences in the EU (issue areas) 
alone is not sufficient. Institutional factors and the member states' constellation of 
interests (and collective identity) in an international institution have to be taken into 
account as well. The EU is less likely to 'speak with one voice', the more national (or 
shared) competence in an issue area, the stricter an international institution's rules of 
participation and the weaker the EU's coordination mechanisms, the more hetero-
geneous the EU member states' preferences, and the weaker their collective identity.  
 
The next section introduces the legal competences as a cause for the European 
Union's varying representation across issue areas. The paper then 'brings integration 
theory back in' and discusses explanatory factors beyond competence. Section 3 
explores in detail the institutional aspects of the EU's patchwork position in interna-
tional fora. Section 4 adds member states' interests as a reason for the fragmen-
tation, and section 5 considers the role of identity. The final section draws some 
conclusions from the findings.  
 
                                                 
20    Both international regimes and international organisations qualify as international 
institutions. Keohane defines them as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and 
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations". Robert 
O. Keohane (1989), International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations 
Theory, Boulder, Westview Press, p. 3.  
21    See Sue Basu and Simon Schunz (2008), "Pathways for an Interdisciplinary Analysis: 
Legal and Political Dimensions of the European Union's Position in Global Multilateral 
Governance", Working Paper, 11, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies, pp. 6-14. 
22   International actorness can be defined as "the EU's ability to function actively and 
deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system". Martijn L.P. Groenleer and 
Louise G. van Schaik (2007), "United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness 
in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol", Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 45(5), p. 972. 
23   Pisani-Ferry (2005), op.cit., pp. 14-15. 
24   Sapir (2007), op.cit, p. 19. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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2. The Legal Approach: 'Issue Areas Matter' 
 
The EU's external representation has been evolving as a result of both Treaty amend-
ments and case law. In fact, the Treaties explicitly define the external competence in 
only a few instances; in particular, the Treaty establishing the European Community 
expressly grants the EC competence to conclude international agreements in the 
fields of trade policy (Art. 133 TEC), international monetary and exchange-rate 
matters (Art. 111 TEC) and development coperation (Art. 177 TEC). In a cursory 
manner, external competences are mentioned for migration (Art. 61 TEC), 
competition (Art. 81f TEC) and environment (Art. 174 TEC).25 Following the European 
Court of Justice's landmark ruling in the ERTA case of 1971 and subsequent case law, 
external competence can in addition be derived implicitly from internal compe-
tence.26 This 'doctrine of implied powers' allows the Community to act externally in 
matters which it may regulate internally if the internal competence has been 
exercised effectively and the international agreement is conducive to achieving the 
Treaty objectives. The Lisbon Treaty captures this in the provision that "[t]he Union 
shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is 
necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its 
conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope".  
 
The procedure for the conclusion of external agreements in first pillar matters is 
generally set out in Art. 300 TEC (plus Art. 133 for trade negotiations and Art. 310 for 
association agreements). The Council decides on the opening and conclusion of 
negotiations, while the Commission is responsible for conducting them.27 Through the 
appointment of special committees overseeing the negotiations, the Council is 
granted supervisory powers. In the case of shared competence, the member states 
may also act as agents of the Community, and the EMU introduced the European 
Central Bank (ECB) as another potential agent.28  
 
The current situation of external representation can more or less be summarised as 
follows: In cases where the EC itself is a member of the international institution and 
the issue addressed lies within its exclusive competence, the Community acts 
through the European Commission, which is assisted by a committee of representa-
tives of the member states (e.g. the 'Art. 133 committee' for trade policy). In cases of 
shared competence (or of exclusive competence without formal EC membership in 
                                                 
25   The EU has exclusive competence in the areas of the common commercial policy, 
competition rules, monetary policy for the euro zone, and the conservation of marine 
biological resources. Agriculture and fisheries, development cooperation and humanitarian 
aid, environment, transport or energy are among the areas of shared competence. 
26   See  Piet  Eeckhout  (2004),  External Relations of the European Union: Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 58-100. 
27   For the conclusion of international agreements on second and third pillar matters, Art. 
24 TEU foresees that the Council may authorise the presidency, assisted by the Commission as 
appropriate, to conduct negotiations.  
28    On the procedure for a status request in an international organisation see Frank 
Hoffmeister (2007), "Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and 
European Law on the Status of the European Union in International Organizations and Treaty 
Bodies", Common Market Law Review, 44(1), pp. 58-65. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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the international institution), the presidency usually represents the EU on the basis of a 
position coordinated within a committee composed of the member states and the 
Commission. For example, Article 174:4 TEC gives the EU member states the option to 
negotiate by themselves in international environmental bodies, while taking into 
account the general duty to cooperate. In areas of national competence, member 
states may in principle speak for themselves, but they often coordinate their 
positions. Under the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the 
EU is represented by the presidency, assisted by the High Representative for the 
CFSP, while the Commission is fully associated (Art. 18 TEU).  
 
Table 1 illustrates how the external representation varies across issue areas. For 
exclusive competences, representation generally follows the principle of delegation 
to an EU institution, whereas in the fields of shared (or national) competences, coor-
dination processes among the member states and representation by the presidency 
prevail. Cœuré and Pisani-Ferry thereby distinguish three models of governance: 
unconditional delegation, supervised delegation and coordination with other 
member states and EU institutions.29  
 
Table 1: EU external representation in selected issue areas 
  Competi-
tion 
Trade  Intl macro-
economics/
money 
Develop-
ment 
Environ-
ment 
Foreign 
policy 
Compe-
tence 
exclusive  
(national 
below the 
threshold) 
exclusive for 
goods & most 
services; shared 
for audiovisual, 
educational, 
cultural, social 
& human 
health services 
exclusive for 
money & ex-
change rates 
(euro area); 
national in 
other fields 
shared  
(EU policy 
alongside 
member 
states' 
policies) 
shared  
(exclusive 
for marine 
biological 
resources) 
national 
Govern-
ance 
model 
unconditio-
nal delega-
tion to 
Commission 
supervised 
delegation to 
Commission  
mix of uncon-
ditional dele-
gation to ECB 
& supervised 
delegation to 
Eurogroup/ 
ECOFIN presi-
dency & co-
ordination 
mix of su-
pervised 
delegation 
to Commis-
sion & coor-
dination 
mix of su-
pervised 
delegation 
to EU presi-
dency or 
Commission 
& coordi-
nation 
coordina-
tion 
External 
represen-
tation 
Commission Commission 
(based on a 
Council autho-
risation) 
mostly mem-
ber states, 
but also ECB, 
Eurogroup/ 
ECOFIN 
presidency & 
Commission 
Commission 
& member 
states 
member 
states/EU 
presidency 
with Com-
mission 
member 
states (with 
presidency, 
assisted by 
Commission 
& High Rep-
resentative 
for CFSP) 
 
Source: based on Cœuré and Pisani-Ferry (2007), op.cit., pp. 34-35. 
 
                                                 
29   Benoît Cœuré and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2007), "The Governance of the European Union's 
International Economic Relations: How Many Voices?", in André Sapir (ed.), Fragmented 
Power: Europe and the Global Economy, Brussels, Bruegel, pp. 29-31. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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As a result, the more national competence in an issue area, the less likely the EU is 
'speaking with one voice'. However, there is considerable variation in external 
representation not only across, but sometimes also within issue areas. For example, 
financial markets, energy and the environment are aggregations of heterogeneous 
subfields with differing degrees of competence and various governance arrange-
ments. In external monetary relations, "[t]he president of the ECB is empowered to 
speak to questions of monetary and exchange rate policy, but shares authority with 
the Euro-group on exchange rate matters, has little authority on financial regulation, 
and no authority on fiscal matters".30 Moreover, internal competence alone falls short 
of explaining variation in EU actorness between areas of shared competence: for 
example, why does the Union speak with one voice in international environmental 
negotiations but not in finance? Even within an issue area, external representation 
may vary. In trade policy, for instance, the Commission acts as sole negotiator and 
spokesperson for the EU in the WTO, whereas both the Commission and the member 
states speak when the same trade issues are discussed in the OECD, and in UNCTAD 
the EU presidency speaks on behalf of the EU as does the Commission.31 The legal 
competence is thus not necessarily the best indicator for the EU's role in an 
institution.32 Additional explanatory factors derived from institutionalist approaches 
are needed. 
 
 
3. The Institutionalist Approach: 'Institutions Matter' 
 
Historical institutionalism points to the importance of both internal and external 
institutional factors. It claims that national preferences are (partly) endogenous to 
the institutional setting and that the entrenchment of institutional arrangements may 
obstruct an easy reversal of initial choices and involve high costs. As Pierson argues, 
"actors may be in a strong initial position, seek to maximize their interests, and never-
theless carry out institutional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their 
own positions (or those of their successors) in ways that are unanticipated".33 In spite 
of potential gains from a common representation, institutional constraints emanating 
from either the EU or an international organisation may thus prevent reform. 
Institutions tend to be 'sticky' and rather resistant to change. Moreover, EU member 
states may 'lose control' over the integration process due to their short-sightedness, 
unintended consequences or autonomous actions of EU institutions. Cœuré and 
Pisani-Ferry thus find that the choice of Europe's governance models for its external 
representation "is inherited from history rather than being based on efficiency 
                                                 
30   C. Randall Henning and Sophie Meunier (2005), "United Against the United States? The 
EU's Role in Global Trade and Finance", in Nicolas Jabko and Craig Parsons (eds.), The State 
o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n ,  V o l .  7 :  W i t h  U S  o r  Against US? European Trends in American 
Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 87. 
31   Joakim Reiter (2005), "The European Union as Actor in International Relations: The Role 
of the External Environment for EU Institutional Design", in Ole Elgström and Christer Jönsson 
(eds.), European Union Negotiations: Processes, Networks and Institutions, London, Routledge, 
p.151. 
32   Basu and Schunz (2008), op.cit., p. 39. 
33    Paul Pierson (1996). "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis". Comparative Political Studies, 29(2), p. 126. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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criteria".34 In other words, path dependence matters more than rational criteria 
regarding the design of external arrangements.  
 
In the same vein, Reiter argues that EU actorness is shaped not only by internal 
competences, but also by the external environment, especially the issue-specific 
international institutional settings.35 The extent of common representation is likely to 
be higher in case of consensus-based decision-making, a narrow scope and binding 
rules of international cooperation as well as in case of an inclusive membership of 
(almost) all EU member states in the institution. In other words, EU member states are 
more reluctant to create a 'single voice' if the institution deals with a broadly defined 
area of cooperation and an exchange of information and best practices rather than 
binding agreements, and if only a few of them actually are members of the 
institution. For example, Reiter claims that the EU member states in the OECD are 
reluctant to agree to 'speak with one voice' in view of the "broad scope of the 
OECD, the organization's focus on best practices and soft law, as well as the 
dominance of EU countries in the total membership and the fact that not all EU 
members are part of the organization".36 In comparison, in the negotiation-oriented 
WTO, "the EU member states have a shared interest to agree to act as a single entity" 
and the well-defined scope of the organisation means "that intense coordination 
poses less of a threat to the EU member states".37  
 
The stricter the international institution's rules of participation, the broader and less 
binding its cooperation and the weaker the EU's own coordination, the less likely the 
EU is 'speaking with one voice'. The rules of participation embrace an institution's 
provisions and practices regarding membership, procedure and decision-making: 
can only states or also other actors become members, what other forms of involve-
ment (e.g. observer status) are possible and how are decisions taken (constituencies, 
voting or consensus, weighted voting or 'one state, one vote')?  
 
Art. 302 TEC instructs "the Commission to ensure the maintenance of all appropriate 
relations with the organs of the United Nations and of its specialised agencies" as well 
as to "maintain such relations as are appropriate with all international organisations". 
In the framework of the UN system, three different legal statuses are available: 
member, full participant and observer.38 Observer status generally involves a right to 
speak, but not to vote, to propose amendments, to preside over meetings or to serve 
as rapporteur. Presence is limited to formal meetings, and interventions take place 
after those of all state parties. Full participation corresponds to an enhanced 
observer status with all the rights, except for voting. Moreover, for the negotiation of 
conventions under UN auspices and for world conferences, it has become practice 
to include formulations in the procedural rules that allow the Community to become 
                                                 
34   Cœuré and Pisani-Ferry (2007), op.cit., p. 50. 
35   Reiter (2005), op.cit., pp. 148-163. 
36   Ibid., p. 158. 
37   Ibid. 
38   See Frank Hoffmeister and Pieter-Jan Kuijper (2006), "The Status of the European Union 
at the United Nations: Institutional Ambiguities and Political Realities", in Jan Wouters, Frank 
Hoffmeister and Tom Ruis (eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger 
Partnership, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 14-15. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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a full participant. A 'regional integration organisation' clause may be inserted in 
international agreements to allow such organisations to sign and accede to the 
protocols or conventions (e.g. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety or Kyoto Protocol). 
 
The European Community is currently a full member of the WTO, the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).39 It enjoys the status of a full 
participant at the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) as well as several UN world summits and 
conferences. The EC is an observer at the UN General Assembly, the UN Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE), 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the International Atomic Energy 
Agency40 (IAEA), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the UN Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UN-Habitat, the World 
Customs Organisation and the World Food Programme (WFP). The remainder of this 
section studies the most important political, economic, financial, environmental and 
security institutions in more detail.  
 
Political Institutions 
 
In addition to the Treaty provisions dealing with the United Nations, Art. 303 TEC 
forsees that "[t]he Community shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation 
with the Council of Europe". The Council of Europe and the EC have close contacts 
(e.g. quadripartite meetings between the EU presidency, the Commission, the 
Council of Europe chairmanship and Secretary General as well as officials from the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat attending each other's expert meetings). 
Their broad cooperation (e.g. education, human rights, rule of law, democracy and 
good governance) is based on the exchange of letters, a Joint Declaration on 
Cooperation and Partnership between the Council of Europe and the Commission as 
well as a Memorandum of Understanding. An increasing number of Council of 
Europe conventions is also open to accession by the European Community, and the 
Lisbon Treaty would contain the legal basis for the accession of the EU to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Yet, the EC has no formal observer status at 
the Council of Europe. Currently "the meetings and activities of the Committee of 
Ministers, Minister's Deputies, rapporteur groups of the deputies and any other 
working party convenved will be open to the Commission at the invitation of the 
competent Council of Europe authorities".41 
 
                                                 
39   In addition, the EC is a member of several regional fisheries organisations. See also 
Hoffmeister (2007), op.cit., pp. 43-52.  
40   In the IAEA, Euratom holds the observer status. 
41   Hoffmeister (2007), op.cit., p. 51. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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Membership in the United Nations remains impossible for the EU as the UN Charter 
( A r t i c l e  4 )  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  m e m b e r s h i p  i s  o p e n  t o  s t a t e s  o n l y . 42 The 27 EU member 
states do not constitute an own regional group with regard to the election of states 
to UN bodies and organs: some are in the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG), 
some in the Eastern Europe Group (EEG), and Cyprus is in the Asian Group. There are 
two non-permanent seats on the Security Council filled by the WEOG and one by the 
EEG. Hence, besides France and the United Kingdom, two other EU member states 
are on average represented on the Security Council.  
 
The rules of procedure of several subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (such as 
UNICEF, UNDP, UNEP) allow for an invitation of the Community, and the UN Security 
Council may invite any UN member state (e.g. the EU presidency which is not a 
member of the Council) or competent person (e.g. a Commissioner) to participate in 
its discussions. A more recent example of the impact of institutional rules is the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission which comprises several EU member states and the EC. 
Its creation has generated controversial discussions about who – the presidency, the 
High Representative and/or the European Commission – should represent the EU in 
this cross-pillar field and behind which nameplate (European Community or Euro-
pean Union).43 A nameplate reading 'European Union', as desired by the EU, was 
rejected by the UN Office for Legal Affairs, inter alia, because it did not reflect the list 
of recognised missions to the UN.44  
 
EU coordination on UN matters has increased significantly over time.45 Coordination 
between the EU member states, the Council and the Commission encompasses the 
six main committees of the General Assembly and its subordinate bodies, including 
ECOSOC and its functional commissions. More than 1'000 internal EU coordination 
meetings are conducted each year in both New York and Geneva.46 Besides 
thematic working groups, a horizontal working group on UN matters (CONUN – 
Correspondence United Nations) meets on a monthly basis in Brussels to coordinate 
EU positions. To ensure continuity from one presidency to the next, the EU sometimes 
                                                 
42   The FAO had to modify its statutes in order to allow the Community to become a 
member alongside the EU member states, and they vote on matters within their respective 
competence. See Joni Heliskoski (2000), "Internal Struggle for International Presence: The 
Exercise of Voting Rights within the FAO", in Alan Dashwood and Christophe Hillion (eds.), The 
General Law of E.C. External Relations, London, Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 79-99. 
43    See Martina Spernbauer (2008), "Illustrating EU Representation and Coordination in 
Post-conflict Peace-building: The UN Peace Building Commission", Paper presented at the 
GARNET conference 'The European Union in International Affairs', Egmont Palace, Brussels, 24-
26 April 2008. 
44   The European Union has a 'cross-pillar' observer status at the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): the Commission represents the EU for matters falling under 
Community competence, while the presidency represents the EU in CFSP areas.  
45    See Esa Paasivirta and Dominic Porter (2006), "EU Coordination at the UN General 
Assembly and ECOSOC: A View from Brussels, a View from New York", in Jan Wouters, Frank 
Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever 
Stronger Partnership, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser, pp. 35-48; and Jan Verbeke (2006), "EU 
Coordination on UN Security Council Matters", in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys 
(eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, 
T.M.C. Asser, pp. 49-60. 
46   www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/articleslist_s30_en.htm (6 March 2008). BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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meets partners in the UN represented in the format of a troika, which is composed of 
the current and future presidencies, the Commission and the Council Secretariat. 
Since each member state will have a presidency semester, there is a shared interest 
in making the coordination process effective. Analysis of the voting pattern of EU 
member states in the UN General Assembly shows an increasing cohesion.47 If united, 
the Union constitutes a powerful voting bloc, and many candidate and neigh-
bouring states often associate themselves with EU statements and resolutions in the 
General Assembly.  
 
The permanent representations of the member states work together with the Council 
and the Commission to prepare and finalise an EU position. The Council Secretariat 
has a New York liaison office and a Geneva secretariat, and the European Commis-
sion has delegations accredited to UN bodies in Geneva, Paris, Nairobi, New York, 
Rome and Vienna. In areas of exclusive Community competence, the Commission 
pushes for a common position and may then represent the EC in the UN. In areas of 
the first pillar where the Community has no exclusive competence, the Commission 
attempts to reinforce the coordination process and support the presidency. 
However, the Commission rarely delivers common statements in the General 
Assembly, even in areas for which it is responsible, but the presidency presents them. 
This is partially due to the fact that as an observer, the Commission can only speak 
after all UN member states. In the UN Security Council, the EU may only act under the 
condition that common positions can be reached between the member states. 
Farrell rightly observes that "effective participation by the EU in the UN multilateral 
system remains restricted by the peculiarities of the EU system, its mix of intergovern-
mentalism and supranationality that variously enhances the power and influence of 
individual member states and at other times places limitations on the supranational 
institutions, including the European Commission".48  
 
In the second pillar, member states shall coordinate their action in international 
organisations and at international conferences and uphold common positions (Art. 
19 TEU).49 This applies as well to international fora where not all member states 
participate, in which case those present shall keep the latter informed of any matter 
of common interest. More precisely, those EU member states represented on the UN 
Security Council – where the Community has no status – will concert with the others, 
and especially the permanent members will "ensure the defence of the positions and 
the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter" (Art. 19:2 TEU).50 France and the United 
Kingdom should thus uphold the EU position, if there is one, but also take into 
                                                 
47    Helen Young and Nicholas Rees (2005), "EU Voting Behaviour in the UN General 
Assembly, 1990-2002: The EU's Europeanising Tendencies", Irish Studies in International Affairs, 
19, pp. 193-207; Paul Luif (2003), "EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly", Occasional 
Paper, 49, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies.  
48   Mary Farrell (2006), "EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations", in 
Karen E. Smith and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations: 
Intersecting Multilateralisms, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 45. 
49   There are also other Treaty provisions related to coordination such as Art. 180 TEC on 
development cooperation. 
50   One of the objectives of the CFSP is "to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter" (Art. 11:1 TEU).  Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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account the interests of the broader UN membership. 'Article 19 consultations' take 
place in New York once a week at the level of ambassadors and of collaborators in 
charge of Security Council matters. As a result, "[w]hen the Presidency takes the floor 
on the international scene, it can do so in three different capacities: as the EU 
representative in CFSP matters; the representative of its own state, in particular in the 
event no common position (under the second pillar provisions) was reached; or 
representing both the EC and the EU in cross-pillar (first and second pillar) matters 
whereby the thrust of the issue lies within EU competence".51  
 
Economic Institutions 
 
In contrast to the United Nations, both the European Community and the EU member 
states are members of the WTO. According to Art. XII WTO Agreement, any state or 
customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies can 
become a member of the WTO. Authorised by the Council, the Commission 
negotiates on behalf of the EC, even at the ministerial conferences.52 EU member 
states may attend (formal) WTO meetings but the Commission 'speaks with one 
voice'.53 In practice, decisions are reached by consensus, but in case of voting, the 
Community's number of votes is equal to the number of EU member states in the 
WTO (Art. IX WTO Agreement). EU positions are agreed upon through continued 
consultations in the 'Art. 133 committee', which is technically an advisory working 
group of the Council covering the full range of trade negotiations. The deputies 
meet every week, the full members once a month, and there are specific formations 
for services, textiles and steel. The committee functions as a 'sounding board', a 
means of aggregating interests and as a 'watchdog' for the member states 
supervising the Commission.  
 
The scope of the OECD is not limited to trade issues, and its focus is not on binding 
rules but rather on the exchange of information, best practices and soft law. Art. 304 
TEC states that "[t]he Community shall establish close cooperation with the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, the details of which shall be 
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  c o m m o n  a c c o r d " .  I n  f a c t ,  A r t .  1 3  o f  t h e  O E C D  C o n v e n t i o n  i n  
conjunction with a supplementary protocol provides for the Commission's participa-
tion in the organisation's work. This status goes beyond that of a mere observer and is 
similar to a 'full participant' in the UN system. Like the EU member states, the 
                                                 
51   Govaere, Capiau and Vermeersch (2004), op.cit., p. 162. 
52    The Treaty requires an authorisation, but not a formal mandate or negotiating 
directives. If directives are issued, they may be adapted in the bargaining process. The 
Commission also plays a crucial role in the pursuit of trade disputes. See Antonis Antoniadis 
(2004), "The Participation of the European Community in the World Trade Organization: an 
External Look at European Union Constitution-Building", in Takis Tridimas and Paolisa Nebbia 
(eds.),  European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, 
Oxford, Hart, vol. I, pp. 330-336. 
53    Bart Kerremans (2004), "The European Commission and the EU Member States as 
Actors in the WTO Negotiating Process: Decision Making between Scylla and Charibdis?", in 
Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek (eds.), Decision Making Within International Organizations, 
London, Routledge, pp. 52-55. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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Commission maintains a Permanent Delegation to the OECD in Paris.54 Its ambassa-
dor is a member of the OECD Council but without a right to vote when legal acts are 
being adopted.55 Other Commission representatives sit on the various specialised 
committees alongside the national representatives. Even though the Commission 
often takes a leading role, EU member states retain the right to engage in the 
deliberations in most OECD meetings.  
 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions confine membership to countries and apply a system 
of weighted voting based on the members' contributions (quotas). Formal voting 
rarely takes place as decisions are generally made on a consensus basis, taking the 
underlying power distribution into account. In both the IMF and the World Bank, the 
EU member states are spread across ten constituencies: Germany, France and the 
UK hold single seats,56 while the other 24 countries are part of seven different voting 
groups that also include non-EU members. Some EU member states chair their 
constituencies on a permanent (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands) or rotating basis 
(Spain, Nordic-Baltic states), whereas others have an alternate (deputy) executive 
director or no role at all (Ireland, Poland), depending on the internal rules of the 
constituency.57 As a result, even though the EU member states combined hold over 
30 percent of the votes, the Union's influence is rather limited compared to the 
United States (with a quota share of 17 percent).58 On the one hand, the inclusion of 
non-EU countries in constituencies led by an EU member states can bring additional 
voting power for the EU. On the other hand, even if all EU countries agree on a 
common view, some EU members may not be able to support it, if it differs from the 
position of the other constituency members.59  
 
At both Bretton Woods institutions EU coordination is rather recent, informal and not 
very far-reaching.60 EU member states participating in EMU have lost their monetary 
sovereignty, and external representation in this field is the exclusive responsibility of 
the ECB. For exchange-rate policies, competences in the euro area are shared 
                                                 
54   The ECB is a member of the EC delegation to the OECD and is allowed to participate 
in the work of the relevant committees and working groups alongside the Commission. 
55    The Commission may only exercise a right to vote in the OECD development 
committee, where the EC acts as an additional donor. In the case of the FAO-WHO Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, where the EC is a member, the rules of procedure foresee that the 
voting power of the Community depends on the presence of the EU member states. 
Hoffmeister (2007), op.cit., pp. 44, 49. 
56   So do the US, Japan, Russia, China and Saudia Arabia. 
57   In the G10, which groups together the major creditor countries, France, Germany, the 
UK, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden are represented besides the US, Canada, 
Japan and Switzerland. The president of the ECB attends as an observer. 
58   Bini Smaghi (2004), op.cit., p. 230.  
59   Carole Garnier, Daniel Daco and Francesca Di Mauro (2006), "UN-EU Cooperation on 
Financial Issues: The Role of the European Union at the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank", in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Toms Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and 
the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser, p. 123. 
60    For details, see Eurodad (2006), European Coordination at the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, Brussels, ADS Insight. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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between the ECB and the Eurogroup.61 Yet, the European Central Bank only enjoys 
observer status at the IMF Executive Board. When issues related to the euro are 
discussed, the countries of the euro area 'speak with one voice', with statements 
delivered either by the ECB observer and/or the ECOFIN presidency (in case the 
ECOFIN presidency is held by a country outside the euro area, the task falls upon the 
representative of the euro area country next in line to hold the presidency). 
Coordination takes place both in Brussels, in the Sub-Committee on IMF (SCIMF) 
under the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers,62 and in Washington in the 
EURIMF group, composed of European Executive Directors and other representatives 
of EU member states as well as an observer from the Commission delegation and 
from the European Central Bank. EURIMF covers the day-to-day coordination and 
meets once to three times a week. If a common position has been agreed upon, it is 
presented by the EU presidency (respectively the ECB in case of Eurosystem issues), 
but the other member states can also participate in the discussion. The SCIMF meets 
8 to 10 times a year to monitor IMF activities and consists of two representatives from 
each member state (ministry of finance and central bank) as well as two representa-
tives each from the European Commission and from the ECB. The EU presidency is in 
charge of liaising between the two committees. It also gives a speech at the bi-
annual meetings of the ministerial-level International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC). The ECB participates in the IMFC as an observer, whereas the 
Eurogroup president does not participate, unless one of the members from the euro 
area cedes the seat. In sum, the EU's representation at the IMF is characterised by 
increasing cooperation on an ad hoc, informal basis.  
 
EU coordination at the World Bank is less structured. European representatives (plus 
the Commission as an observer) meet at least once a week to exchange information 
and to reach coordinated or joint statements that are prepared by the EU 
presidency.63 At the bi-annual meetings of the Joint IMF/World Bank Development 
Committee, where the Commission holds observer status, the Commissioner for 
development submits a speech on behalf of the Community. However, the EC and 
the member states may have different donor interests. In addition, several ministries 
may be responsible for World Bank matters at national level, and "coordination may 
be difficult both between and within ministries".64 The creation of an EU-level 
committee for World Bank issues – similar to the SCIMF – has therefore lacked 
consensus so far.65 Beyond the issue of representation, the Commission and the World 
Bank are linked through various forms of policy, financial and operational coopera-
tion. 
 
                                                 
61    The Eurogroup consists of the finance ministers of EU member states that have 
adopted the euro. They usually meet a day before a meeting of the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN). 
62   The SCIMF is a subcommittee of the Economic and Financial Committee which was 
set up for the EMU and is composed of high-level officials of finance ministries and central 
banks. 
63   For coordinated statements the EU presidency prepares a text which is referred to by 
the other EU Board members, while for joint statements the EU presidency prepares a text 
which is issued in the name of those who endorse it. 
64   Garnier, Daco, and Di Mauro (2006), op.cit., p. 124. 
65   Ibid. p. 126. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
  18
In contrast to the Bretton Woods institutions, several informal groupings of states that 
base their cooperation on non-binding decisions have been created. Whereas the 
G8 maintains a broad range of activities, the scope of the younger G20 and the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is much narrower. The EU is a full participant (yet not a 
formal member) in the G8 summit process but does not chair or host a summit. It is 
represented by the president of the European Commission and the EU presidency. 
The EU does not bring a formal mandate to the summit meetings but attempts to 
present a coherent position. "The prevailing opinion is that there is no reason for co-
ordination if the position of the relevant states does not interfere with co-ordinated 
EU positions or policies, or if the relevant states do not bind the EU in any way with 
their respective positions within the G7/8."66 The Commission reports to the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) of the Council of Ministers prior 
to and following each G8 summit. In the meetings of the G7 finance ministers, the 
presidents of the ECB and of the Eurogroup attend meetings on the economic 
situation and exchange rates. In the first part of the G7 finance ministers' meetings, 
which deal with the surveillance of economic policies, including exchange-rate 
issues, the president of the ECB replaces the central bank governors of the three euro 
area countries (Germany, France and Italy). The second part of the meeting deals 
with other matters, such as the architecture of the international financial system and 
development policy, and is attended by all the finance ministers and central bank 
governors of the G7 countries.67 In addition, the G8 foreign ministers usually meet 
twice a year, with the participation of the Commissioner for external relations.  
 
The G20, established in 1999 as a response to the financial crises of the late 1990s, 
brings together systemically important industrial countries and emerging market 
economies from all regions of the world to discuss key issues of global economic 
stability. The members of the G20 are the finance ministers and central bank 
governors of 19 countries plus the European Union. The EU is represented by the four 
European G7 members, the ECOFIN presidency and the ECB. In contrast to the G7 
meetings, the ECB participates fully, but the Eurogroup president does not. The 
European Commission participates at a technical level in the delegation.68  
 
The FSF, which was established by the G7 finance ministers in 1999, brings together 
representatives of governments, central banks and financial services regulators from 
twelve countries as well as several international institutions. Only five EU member 
states (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK) and the ECB participate. 
The Commission is not represented. Based on a consensual way of decision-making, 
the Forum addresses the vulnerabilities affecting the international financial system by 
improving coordination and promoting (non-binding) standards and guidelines. In 
the FSF the EU has not attempted to act as a single entity or to coordinate positions 
through common understandings.69  
                                                 
66   Klemens Fischer (2001), "The G7/8 and the European Union", in John J. Kirton, Joseph P. 
Daniels and Andreas Freytag (eds.), Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First 
Century, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 129-130. 
67    Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2006), "Powerless Europe: Why is the Euro Area Still a Political 
Dwarf?", International Finance, 9(2), p. 264.  
68   Bini Smaghi, (2006), op.cit., p. 266. 
69   Reiter (2005), op.cit., p. 161. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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Environmental Institutions 
 
At the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Earth Summit) in 1992, 
the Community requested and was granted full participant status, which gave it the 
same representation as the member states, except for the right to vote or submit 
procedural motions. The Council had agreed that on all questions within exclusive 
Community competences the Commission would present the EC position at the 
conference, negotiate on its behalf and express its views, while the presidency would 
generally express the common positions and negotiate in areas of shared compe-
tences (unless it had been agreed in coordination that the Commission would do 
so).70 As a result of the 'regional integration organisation' clause, the EC is a signatory 
alongside the EU member states to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change as well as the Convention on Biological Diversity. Moreover, the EC became 
a full participant in the Commission on Sustainable Development.71  
 
Most international environmental agreements are mixed agreements. Hence, who 
speaks on behalf of the EU in multilateral environmental negotiations may vary 
considerably: the Commission, the presidency or the EU member states themselves. 
With regard to climate change, for instance, the Council of Ministers has not 
authorised the Commission to conduct the negotiations.72 Its lead negotiator is the 
presidency, which is assisted by the Commission and the incoming presidency in the 
troika. They operate with a consensus-based mandate from the Environment Council 
of Ministers. As an informal practice, member states act as leaders for certain issues 
to create more consistency in view of the bi-annually rotating presidency. In the 
negotiations on a biosafety protocol, by contrast, the Commission initially received a 
negotiating mandate with regard to matters within the Community's field of compe-
tence and it was required to conduct its negotiations 'in dialogue with' a committee 
of member state representatives.73 Later on, a second mandate specified that the 
Commission would handle all trade and acquis-related issues, while the presidency 
would negotiate all other matters. In a final negotiating mandate, the Commission 
assumed the role of sole EU negotiator on most issues, albeit with input from member 
states during preparatory meetings.  
 
                                                 
70   L.J. Brinkhorst (1994), "The European Community at UNCED: Lessons to Be Drawn for the 
Future", in Deirdre Curtin and Ton Heukels (eds.), Institutional Dynamics of European Integra-
tion: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 613. 
71    On issues within exclusive Community competence, EU member states in the CSD 
would exercise their vote on the basis of an EC position, while in areas of mixed competence 
coordination efforts would be made to secure a common position. On issues of national 
competence (or where coordination failed), EU members should vote bearing in mind the 
desirability of concerted action.  
72   Groenleer and van Schaik (2007), op.cit., p. 985. 
73   Mark Rhinard and Michael Kaeding (2006), "The International Bargaining Power of the 
European Union in 'Mixed' Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000 Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety", Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(5), pp. 1034-1035. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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Security Institutions 
 
Cooperation between the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the EU has developed more closely since the 1990s with regard to 
conflict prevention, crisis management and democratisation (including election 
monitoring), as both sides' activities have grown in these fields.74 Regular meetings 
take place from the EU-OSCE ministerial troika level to staff-to-staff meetings of the 
organisations, and also on the ground, there are regular contacts among the OSCE 
field missions and representatives of the EU and its members, including with the 
delegations of the Commission or EU special representatives. However, the status of 
the EU at the OSCE has never been formally defined. The Commission's participation 
was specified in the 2006 OSCE rules of procedure: it is regarded as being part of the 
delegation of the EU presidency, and as such the Commission can participate in all 
proceedings unless an issue clearly falls fully outside the scope of the EU (e.g. specific 
military issues). The Commission has its own ambassador accredited to the OSCE and 
its representative sits in all OSCE decision-making bodies next to the country holding 
the EU presidency.75 In areas of Community competence, the Commission is inter-
vening in the same way as an OSCE participating state and may speak on behalf of 
all EU member states.  
 
The EU usually puts forward a single statement in the Permanent Council in Vienna, 
which is presented by the ambassador of the country holding the EU presidency. In 
the rare case of disagreement, a member state may express its reservations. The 27 
member states distribute work among themselves with a chef de file drafting the 
respective common statements in an issue area. The OSCE working group of the EU 
Council in Brussels meets once a month and provides the general guidelines, but the 
actual work is carried out by the delegations in Vienna.76 The EU also holds regular 
consultations with the candidate countries and a group of like-minded states (e.g. 
Norway, Switzerland, Canada). The OSCE members aligned with the EU position thus 
gain numerical prevalence. The EU troika also consults with the OSCE chairmanship. 
The president of the Commission participates in the summits and the Commissioner 
for external relations in the annual ministerial Councils of the OSCE. At ministerial or 
heads of state level, the Commission intervenes right after the EU presidency. 
 
                                                 
74    The Lisbon Treaty explicitly adds the OSCE by stating that the Union shall establish 
"appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised 
agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development" as well as appropriate 
relations with other international organisations. 
75   The  Commission  is  de facto treated as an individual OSCE participant concerning 
protocol issues or the circulation of documents.  
76    See Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva (2007), "EU Co-ordination in International 
Organizations: The Case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organization for 
S e c u r i t y  a n d  C o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  E u r o p e " ,  i n  N i c o l a  C a s a r i n i  a n d  C o n s t a n z a  M u s u  ( e d s . ) ,  
European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road towards Convergence, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 34-38. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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Finally, national security remains the responsibility of the member states, but 21 EU 
member states are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).77 
Cooperation between the EU and NATO has significantly developed in recent years, 
in particular with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP. The latter paved 
the way for the 2003 'Berlin plus' arrangements, which allow the EU access to NATO's 
collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations in crisis management in which 
NATO as a whole is not engaged. NATO and EU officials meet on a regular basis at 
the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors (the North Atlantic Council with the EU's 
Political and Security Committee), the Military Committees and at staff level.78  
 
Table 2 summarises the EU's representation in various international institutions of 
global importance. It shows that not only the issue area, but also the international 
institution in an issue area matter for the EU's external representation.  
 
Nevertheless, the governance arrangement on which the external representation is 
based does not necessarily guarantee or prevent a high degree of international 
actorness. The common representation depends also on the extent to which the EU 
member states agree with each other. The constituencies in the international 
financial institutions, for example, are largely established through self-determination. 
The EU countries could decide to join the same constituency in the IMF; the Fund's 
statutes only indicate that the five largest shareholders should be represented 
individually. Hence, other factors must prevent them from pooling their voices. 
 
                                                 
77    Two declarations annexed to the Lisbon Treaty underline that its provisions do not 
affect the responsibilities of the member states for the conduct of their foreign policy nor of 
their national representation in third countries and international organisations.  
78   See Johannes Varwick (2006), "European Union and NATO: Partnership, Competition 
or Rivalry?", Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik, no. 18, Kiel, Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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Table 2: EU external representation in selected international institutions 
Institution Members  EU representation 
Political Institutions 
Council of 
Europe 
27 EU member states (out of 47)   member states, contacts of presidency and 
Commission with Council of Europe on 
various levels 
UN General 
Assembly 
27 EU member states (out of 192)  coordination, observer status for EC 
(Commission) but usually presidency speaks 
UN Security 
Council 
2 EU member states with perma-
nent seats and usually 2 with 
temporary seats (out of 15) 
member states, coordination 
Economic Institutions 
WTO  27 EU member states (out of 151) 
and EC 
Commission, supervised by 'Art. 133 
committee'  
OECD  19 EU member states (out of 30)  Commission is 'full participant' alongside 
member states, observer status for ECB 
International Financial Institutions 
IMF  27 EU member states (out of 185)  coordination, mixed constituencies of EU 
member states and non-members; observer 
status for ECB in Executive Board and IMFC; 
one voice for euro area members on mone-
tary issues (ECB or ECOFIN presidency); 
ECOFIN presidency speaks in IMFC  
World Bank  27 EU member states (out of 185)  coordination, mixed constituencies of EU 
member states and non-members; EU presi-
dency speaks; observer status for Commis-
sion in Joint IMF/World Bank Development 
Committee  
G8 summits  4 EU member states (out of 8)   member states, EU 'full participant' (Com-
mission president and EU presidency) 
G7 Finance 
Ministers 
4 EU member states (out of 7)  Eurogroup president and ECB president par-
ticipate in discussions on surveillance and 
exchange rates; otherwise finance ministers 
and central bank governors of members  
G20  4 EU member states (out of 19) 
and EU 
ECOFIN presidency and ECB 
FSF   5 EU member states (out of 12) 
and ECB 
member states (national central banks) and 
ECB 
Environmental Institutions 
CSD  10 EU member states (out of 53)  EC full participant; member states and 
Commission  
Climate change 
negotiations 
27 EU member states (out of 192)  EC full participant; presidency, assisted by 
Commission  
Biodiversity 
negotiations 
27 EU member states (out of 190)  EC full participant; Commission, supervised 
by committee, and/or presidency 
Security Institutions 
OSCE  27 EU member states (out of 56)  Commission ('de facto participant') and 
presidency 
NATO  21 EU member states (out of 26) 
 
member states 
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4. The Intergovernmentalist Approach: 'Interests Matter' 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism, inspired by neorealist and liberal theory, argues that 
any international agreement requires that the interests of the dominant domestic 
groups in the participating countries converge.79 From this perspective, there is an 
inherent tendency towards lowest common denominator outcomes, and new supra-
national solutions in the EU are only put in place when necessary to make credible 
commitments (e.g. to constrain and control the other governments). The EU itself is 
regarded as an international institution (rather than as a global actor), the function-
ing of which reflects the underlying distribution of relative power among its members.  
 
From such a perspective, especially the larger EU member states are considered 
reluctant to pool sovereignty in external representation. They are particularly 
concerned about their autonomy, influence and prestige and thus prefer national 
representation. This applies foremost in areas of 'high politics', for instance regarding 
a single EU seat on the UN Security Council. As a result, a common voice can only be 
envisaged where internal EU arrangements make a single external policy technically 
inevitable in the less crucial areas of 'low politics' such as trade. A joint representation 
would require a convergence of national preferences between small and big EU 
member states or between those with a privileged and a 'normal' position in an 
institution. The more uneven the underlying power distribution in an international 
institution and the more diverse the member states' preferences, the less likely the EU 
is 'speaking with one voice'. 
 
Any changes in the EU's external representation are difficult because they would 
lead to a (re)distribution of power within the Union –  some member states would win 
and others lose. A joint external representation is thus more likely in case of a rather 
equal power distribution; EU member states are more reluctant to 'speak with a single 
voice', if a few of them have retained a privileged position in an international 
institution.80 Frieden argues that "adopting a common international EU policy is 
analogous to adopting a common internal EU policy: it requires that member states 
weigh the potential benefits of a common policy against the potential costs of a 
policy that is not to their liking", hence, "there is a clear trade-off between the 
advantages of scale and the disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous prefer-
ences".81 Countries whose policy positions are similar to those of their European 
partners are likely to be more in favour of common representatives. EU member 
states may also be more inclined to pool their representation, if it increases the EU's 
international bargaining power – which is more likely in institutions with a narrowly 
defined area of cooperation and binding decisions and where all EU member states 
are present. Pooling EU representation must have an 'added value' compared to 
mere voting coalitions. In some issue areas and international organisations, pooling is 
more likely to improve the EU's alternative options than in others. "Common EU 
positions on trade or financial regulation – where outside options, and thus 
                                                 
79   See Andrew Moravcsik (1998), The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power 
from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, chapter 1. 
80   Reiter (2005), op.cit., pp. 148-163. 
81   Jeffrey Frieden (2004), "One Europe, One Voice? The Political Economy of European 
Union Representation in International Organizations", European Union Politics, 5(2), p. 262. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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bargaining power, are related to size – are likely to be greater than the sum of their 
parts, whereas a common EU position on Amazonian biodiversity may not be."82  
 
Hence, one of the main difficulties that "the EU has to solve is the internal redistribu-
tion of power that will follow a redefinition of its external representation".83 In the field 
of international macroeconomics, for instance, "the bigger member states – those 
who belong to the G7 – hold a de facto monopoly of external representation", and 
delegating power to the EU would imply sharing supervision with the smaller member 
states.84 Also in the Bretton Woods institutions, "the major losers in the adoption of a 
supervised delegation model would again be the bigger countries: Germany, the UK 
and France, whose current weights within the EU representation at the IMF 
significantly exceed their weights within the EU".85 Also smaller countries, which 
currently have a representative on the boards, may hold strong views against 
institutional reforms. In recently created fora, "where the problem of national 
representatives having to leave their seats at the table does not exist", a European 
representation might be easier to achieve.86  
 
Beyond the interests of the EU member states themselves, those of other members of 
an international institution may at times stand in the way of a joint EU representation. 
For example, the US government had in the past opposed Community membership 
in the World Costums Organisation or the UN Informal Consultative Process on the 
Law of the Sea as well as an EC request for full participation in the UNHCR executive 
board.87 
 
Finally, the conditions created by other international institutions may affect the EU's 
willingness to proceed to joint representation; there might be competing interests, for 
example an overlap between ESDP functions and the tasks of the OSCE (or NATO). 
Member states might attempt to use the forum that suits their purposes best. And 
reforms such as the creation of a single EU chair at the IMF would not only affect the 
balance of power at the Fund but also the EU's representation in other IFIs.  
 
 
5. The Constructivist Approach: 'Identities Matter' 
 
Constructivism argues that agents and structures are mutually constitutive and that 
"power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them 
up".88 Actors follow socially defined norms, driven by the 'logic of appropriateness' 
and feelings of identity (rather than mere utility maximisation). From this point of view, 
the lack of a collective EU identity – in some areas more than in others – may prevent 
a joint external representation. Creating a single European voice takes time because 
                                                 
82   Ibid., p. 267. 
83   Jean Pisani-Ferry (2005), op.cit., p. 14. 
84   Ibid., p. 12. 
85   Ibid.  
86   Bini Smaghi (2006), op.cit., p. 262. 
87   Hoffmeister (2007), op.cit., pp. 44-45, 50. 
88    See Alexander Wendt (1999), Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 135. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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it involves processes of socialisation and the internalisation of norms. In the social 
interaction and deliberation between the EU institutions, the member states and the 
international institutions, a shared belief would have to be constructed about the 
appropriateness of a single EU seat or of EU membership.  
 
Social learning is considered more likely among actors sharing values, facing crisis or 
policy failure, meeting repeatedly with a high density of interaction and being 
insulated from direct political pressure and exposure.89 These conditions are not easily 
fulfilled in the EU's manifold and complex external relations. However, once EU 
member states start to coordinate their policies in an international forum, they may 
become increasingly 'Europeanised'. Groenleer and van Schaik, for instance, find 
with regard to the negotiations on climate change and the International Criminal 
Court of Justice that "Member State representatives appear to have been 
'socialized' by the interaction during the frequent meetings taking place in Brussels 
and the EU co-ordination meetings at international conferences".90 The internalisation 
of norms may thus contribute to the institutionalisation of the EU's joint external 
representation. Even in intergovernmental negotiations the EU may thus 'speak with a 
single voice' as a result of "the considerable congruence of EU Member States' initial 
preferences and the social interactions between EU Member States, third countries 
and non-state actors, through which preferences converged even further over 
time".91 In the long run, identity-building might erode concerns for national represen-
tation and prestige. Such change will, however, be slow.  
 
The weaker the EU's collective identity in an international institution, the less likely the 
EU is 'speaking with one voice'. This identity tends to be weaker, the fewer EU 
member states are part of the institution, the more a 'rival' institution demands loyalty 
and the less similar the European and the international norms. The identity is likely to 
be stronger in case all EU countries are members of an institution.92 Rival institutions in 
the same field might play a role in case of competing norms (e.g. WTO and UNCTAD) 
or loyalties (e.g. NATO). EU member states in mixed groups such as the constituencies 
of the Bretton Woods institutions are often reluctant towards closer coordination, and 
among big members "loyalty has often proved to be stronger to G-7 positions than to 
EU positions".93  
 
 
                                                 
89    Jeffrey Checkel (1999), "Social Construction and Integration", Journal of European 
Public Policy, 6(4), p. 549.  
90   Groenleer and van Schaik (2007), op.cit., p. 989. 
91   Ibid., p. 969. 
92   However, if the EU countries clearly dominate an organisation, giving it per se already 
a 'European identity', there is less need to find a joint representation. For example, the norms 
propagated by the Council of Europe and the EU match very well and all 27 are members of 
the Council. They cooperate closely on human rights, yet the EU does not formally have a 
single voice.  
93   Ibid., p. 161. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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6. Conclusions: A Persistent Patchwork of External Representation 
 
This paper has examined why the European Union's representation in international 
institutions still varies so widely. As a 'patchwork power', the EU is sometimes at the 
conference table and sometimes not, and it does not consistently 'speak with one 
voice' in global governance. Different theoretical approaches suggest issue areas, 
institutions, interests and identities as explanatory factors. The paper argues that a 
focus on issue areas, that is the distribution of legal competences in the EU, is 
important but not sufficient. Institutional factors and the member states' constellation 
of interests have to be taken into account as well. Identity may matter in a long-term 
perspective. The EU is less likely to 'speak with one voice', the more national (or 
shared) competence in an issue area, the stricter an international institution's rules of 
participation and the weaker the EU's coordination mechanisms, the more hetero-
geneous the member states' preferences, and the weaker their collective identity.  
 
It seems that no single integration theory and no single variable explains the 
'patchwork power' Europe. However, further research is required on the relative 
explanatory power of the four factors (issue areas, institutions, interests, identities), 
which may well vary from case to case. In addition to studying what prevents reform 
in the EU's external representation, the question of what triggers change needs to be 
addressed. Will external events set off outside pressures for a single voice, and under 
what conditions will demands arise from within the EU?  
 
The most important political implication is how to address the factors that impede 
the European Union from taking a more active role in global governance. Putting an 
end to the EU's patchwork of external representation is a challenging task: if institutio-
nal factors are important and member states' preferences matter (and if collective 
identity formation is slow), the patchwork in the EU's representation in international 
institutions is – irrespective of the question of competences – likely to persist. 
Moreover, the ongoing enlargement process may hinder deeper policy coordination 
by increasing the heterogeneity of interests or the areas where not all EU member 
states participate. The European Commission is aware that "the impact of EU’s policy 
is weakened by a lack of focus and continuity in its external representation" and 
therefore emphasises that within the existing Treaty framework "the Community and 
intergovernmental methods need to be combined on the basis of what best 
achieves the desired outcome, rather than […] dogma".94 In this respect, the Council 
"could improve up-stream co-ordination to promote the emergence of consensus on 
issues of EU relevance that are subject to discussions in multilateral organisations (UN, 
IFIs), informal bodies (G7/G8, G20) and other fora of global governance".95  
 
Finally, the overrepresentation of Europe in many international institutions (in terms of 
seats or votes) would further exacerbate if the European Union managed to 
increasingly 'speak with a single voice'. In order not to undermine global govern-
                                                 
94   European Commission (2006), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Council of June 2006, Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, 
Effectiveness and Visibility, COM(2006) 278 final, Brussels, 8 June 2006, p. 6. 
95   Ibid., p. 8. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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ance, many authors thus call for Europe, with its static or even shrinking population, 
to adjust to its declining importance in a new global order and to make room for the 
under-represented emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America.96 Such a 
move would enhance the credibility and legitimacy of international institutions and 
avoid that they lose the support of the rising powers. Hence, reforms in favour of joint 
representation and single seats would, on the one hand, allow the Union to 
consolidate its political clout, while at the same time contributing to a more 
equitable system of global governance. In view of the obstacles discussed above, 
however, the fragmentation of the EU's representation in international fora is likely to 
endure. Yet, this patchwork pattern does not necessarily prevent the Union from 
playing a bigger role in international affairs in case it reaches common positions.  
 
 
                                                 
96   For example, Sapir (2007), op.cit., p. 19; and Bini Smaghi (2004), op.cit., pp. 243-244. BRIGG Paper 2/2008 
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